Search results for "Tit for tat"
showing 2 items of 2 documents
A Network Formation Game Approach to Study BitTorrent Tit-for-Tat
2007
The Tit-for-Tat strategy implemented in BitTorrent (BT) clients is generally considered robust to selfish behaviours. The authors of [1] support this belief studying how Tit-for-Tat can affect selfish peers who are able to set their upload bandwidth. They show that there is a "good" Nash Equilibrium at which each peer uploads at the maximum rate. In this paper we consider a different game where BT clients can change the number of connections to open in order to improve their performance. We study this game using the analytical framework of network formation games [2]. In particular we characterize the set of pairwise stable networks the peers can form and how the peers can dynamically reach…
On Unstructured File Sharing Networks
2007
We study the interaction among users of unstructured file sharing applications, who compete for available network resources (link bandwidth or capacity) by opening multiple connections on multiple paths so as to accelerate data transfer. We model this interaction with an unstructured file sharing game. Users are players and their strategies are the numbers of sessions on available paths. We consider a general bandwidth sharing framework proposed by Kelly [1] and Mo and Walrand [2], with TCP as a special case. Furthermore, we incorporate the Tit-for-Tat strategy (adopted by BitTorrent [3] networks) into the unstructured file sharing game to model the competition in which a connection can be …